

Ontario Provincial Police
Consolidated After Action Report



2010 Muskoka G8 Summit

2010 Toronto G20 Summit

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Approval

The Ontario Provincial Police – Consolidated After Action Report – 2010 G8 Summit and 2010 G20 Summit.

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30 November 2011


After Action Report Approved:



30 Nov 11

Date

Chief Superintendent R.M. BRUCE
Commander,
Field Support Bureau
Ontario Provincial Police



01 Dec 11

Date

Deputy Commissioner Larry BEECHEY
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Ontario Provincial Police
G8 / G20 Steering Committee

Introduction & Overview

In June of 2010, the culmination of nearly two years of planning resulted in the execution of successful security operations for the 2010 Muskoka G8 Summit and the 2010 Toronto G20 Summit.

The two Summits, held consecutively during the same weekend, represented the largest policing operation in Canadian history. Providing security for the 100 Internally Protected Persons, and to ensure public safety and security in each theatre of operation, required the unprecedented mobilization of nearly 21,000 police and security personnel from across Canada.

Summits planning involved the close integration of numerous security and support agencies including the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Ontario Provincial Police, Toronto Police Service, Peel Regional Police, and Canadian Forces.

The Summits demonstrated the incredible ability of Canadian policing and security agencies to work in unison, to fulfil a common objective.

Planning Phase

Planning for the G8 Summit commenced in July 2008, shortly after the formal announcement by the Prime Minister of Canada. The scope of Summit planning increased dramatically after September 2009 following the Prime Minister's announcement that Canada would also host the G20 Summit in conjunction with the G8.

The Planning Phase was divided into 2 parts: Strategic (Concept) Planning and Operational Planning. During the strategic planning phase, the OPP contributed to the development of the overall ISU Concept of Operations, as well as developed concept plans for each OPP functional unit.

Conceptual plans, developed largely based on assumptions, described the anticipated operational roles and responsibilities, as well as the human resource and logistical support requirements of each OPP unit. The concept plans provided a basis for the development of future unit operational plans, and were used extensively in the formation of budget projections and logistics planning.

A detailed review was conducted of each Unit's concept plan to ensure:

- Plans were harmonized and interoperable, both internally and externally
- Plans complimented the overall objectives of the ISU mission
- Plans were consistent with current assumptions and threat picture
- Plans were achievable within available resources

OPP G8 / G20 Organization Structure




Figure 2.1

OPP units transitioned from 'conceptual' planning to 'operational' planning in September 2009. Two Joint Operations Planning Groups (JOPG) were established; one for the G8 Summit (Muskoka JOPG) and one for the G20 Summit (GTA JOPG). The OPP took a lead role in the Muskoka JOPG, and a participant role in the GTA JOPG.

Throughout January 2010 to May 2010, the Muskoka JOPG conducted a series of focused plan review sessions with each ISU functional unit. During these sessions, lead unit planners from each agency presented their Unit's current operational plan. Operational planning gaps and issues were continually identified, assessed, and mitigated.

G8 Summit Operations

Due to the topography of the G8 Summit site, effective security measures required expansive perimeters to be established encompassing the high ground around Deerhurst resort.

Perimeters were developed utilizing concentric rings of increasing security around the Summit site. Integrity of the inner, "Controlled Access Zone" (CAZ) was the responsibility of the RCMP, members were strategically positioned along and within the CAZ perimeter to patrol and respond to any incursion. Access points were established into the CAZ for the purpose of vehicle and pedestrian screening. Personal entry into the CAZ required accreditation, magnetometer and physical search of bags and equipment, and explosives sweeps of all vehicles.

Integrity of the "Interdiction Zone", or outer perimeter, was the responsibility of the OPP. The IZ encompassed an area of approximately fourteen square kilometres, and included nearly 1000 residents. The IZ was bisected by a lake and canal system. While the lake and canal provided a natural security barrier along the southern approach to the Summit site, the elevated terrain in the southern area of the IZ afforded clear line-of-sight vantage points from up to 800 metres from the Summit venue.

The north edge of the IZ was secured with a single fence, constructed and erected specifically for that purpose. The northern side of the IZ included Provincial Highway 60, a major east-west artery, which was restricted to accredited traffic during the Summit operations. OPP members were strategically positioned along the entire IZ perimeter. Check points were established at each point of entry. A variety of patrol mediums were utilized within the IZ, including all-terrain vehicles, police patrol vehicles, and foot patrol. Access into the IZ was restricted to accredited residents and persons; however no personal or vehicle searches, beyond visual inspection, were conducted.

Beyond the IZ, a "Surveillance Zone" was defined. The SZ involved early warning and detection for any potential threats approaching the Summit site. Early warning in the SZ was achieved through physical patrols as well as

technical surveillance. Access into the SZ by persons and vehicles was unrestricted.

In addition to the IZ, the OPP established additional security operations within the Town of Huntsville, where the OPP Operations Center and Designated Speech Area were located. Town of Huntsville security operations focused on traffic management, and public safety and security.

G8 – OPP Operational Units

Uniformed Site Operations

Uniformed Site Operations represented the largest component of G8 security operations, involving approximately 1200 uniformed members, providing security and response within the Interdiction Zone, Surveillance Zone, and Town of Huntsville. For span-of-control purposes, site operations was divided into 4 operational sectors; sectors 1 through 3 being in the Interdiction Zone, and sector 4 being the Town of Huntsville. Each sector was under the direct command of an OPP Level 1 Incident Commander (Sector Commander), with dedicated human and logistical resources.

Site Operations included the following functions:

- Static screening checkpoints at all access / egress routes into the Interdiction Zone, as well as other strategic locations within the sectors
- Static critical infrastructure security at pre-identified locations, including communications towers
- Mobile patrols utilizing marked vehicles, all-terrain vehicles, foot patrol, and bicycles
- Quick Response Teams (QRT) comprised of highly mobile uniformed members
- Static security points positioned at pre-identified intervals along the entire security perimeter, including the fence and shore lines
- Patrols in the Surveillance Zone

Marine Operations

Due to the proximity to the Summit venue, marine security operations necessitated the closure of Peninsula Lake and the canal, with the OPP providing on water marine patrol and interdiction.

Marine operations included both static and mobile vessel patrols.

A joint forces operational command and control platform was located on Peninsula Lake.

Specialized Field Resources

The OPP committed significant Specialized Field Resources (SFR) to the G8 Summit, including: public order, explosives disposal, tactical response, crisis negotiation, canine, CBRNe response, emergency response, obstruction removal, underwater search and recovery, tactical emergency medics, and aviation support.

All SFR assets were strategically pre-staged to respond within the G8 theatre of operations.

Public Order operations for the G8 Summit were the responsibility of the OPP, with support from the RCMP, Sudbury Regional Police Service, and York Regional Police Service. Public Order Units were divided into response teams, strategically deployed to respond within the G8 theatre of operations. Additionally, RCMP public order units (Tactical Troops), and Obstruction Removal Team resources were positioned within the Controlled Access Zone.

Traffic Management / Motorcade support

Extensive OPP resources were deployed to the G8 Summit to support traffic management and motorcade route security. Key traffic management functions included:

- Stationary traffic control officers strategically positioned at intersections within the Town of Huntsville and other locations in the Muskoka area, to control and divert traffic as required
- Mobile highway interdiction patrols assigned to highways 11, 400, 60, 35 and 117, to observe the approaches to the Summit site, address traffic related issues, and conduct road closures as required to support motorcade movements and the orderly flow of traffic
- Direct motorcade support, including motorcycles and advance cars

Community Relations Group (CRG)

The CRG, which was operational from the outset of the G8 planning phase, increased substantially during the actual Summit operations. The CRG was divided into operational teams, working 24 / 7 during the Summit period. CRG was assigned to maintain on-ground activist and community liaison, and report issues and activities through the CRG coordinator in the Muskoka Area Command Center.

Crime Management

The OPP, as the police of jurisdiction, was responsible for all aspects of crime management for the G8 Summit. The Crime Management team was divided into the following functional units:

Criminal Investigations

During the planning phase, the OPP established a five member proactive criminal investigations team. This unit conducted investigations and prepared cases for prosecution based on actionable intelligence received from the Joint Intelligence Group (JIG).

During the G8 operational phase additional reactive crime teams were added for the purpose of conducting criminal investigations within the theatre of operations which were directly related to the G8 Summit.

Prisoner Processing and Transport

The OPP established a Prisoner Processing Center (PPC) in the Town of Huntsville, utilizing an unused Ontario Government warehouse facility.

The facility included holding cells, booking lanes, finger print and photograph capabilities, video remand, and seized property / evidence management.

Dedicated Offender Transport Unit (OTU) members and vehicles were available to move arrested persons to the PPC, and from the PPC to the primary court facility.

This team was also responsible for providing uniformed security at the designated primary court facility in Bracebridge.

Forensic Identification

Forensic Identification Services (FIS) officers were committed to the following functions:

- Response to any crime scene by FIS officers (Evidence Gathering Teams)
- Video taping of demonstrations by Scenes of Crime Officers (SOCO) and the management of files by Forensic Identification Support Service (FISS) civilian personnel
- Electronic cataloguing of video for intelligence and investigation purposes in support of crime management teams
- Photographing of prisoners in the field by SOCO in support of the Hand Off Teams (HOT).
- Logging and securing of seized prisoner evidence at the Prisoner Processing Centre
- Maintenance of the Niche Digital Mug Shot (DMS) system for prisoner processing

Hand-off Teams

Hand Off Teams (HOT) were strategically positioned throughout the G8 theatre of operations. These teams were comprised of detective constables and Scenes of Crime Officers (SOCO) officers. Hand Off Teams were responsible for:

- Receiving prisoners from the arresting officer at the site of the arrest, completing a snap-set hand-written arrest report, and photographing the accused person with the arresting officer
- Ensuring legislative requirements regarding Rights to Council and statement cautions were complied with
- Collecting any immediate evidence, statements, and officer notes, required for prosecution

Hand Off Teams were responsible for receiving arrested persons from all G8 security agencies, including the RCMP and CF.

G20 Summit Operations

With the exception of the 400 series highways, the OPP generally played a supportive role in G20 security operations. Due to its commitment to G8 security, the OPP was not in a position to provide substantive resources at the outset of the G20 Summit.

Redeployment from G8 to G20

On-going intelligence supported the assumption that the City of Toronto would face significant protest activity in comparison to the Huntsville / Muskoka area. For that reason, the redeployment of Public Order Units was anticipated.

On June 26th, due to the escalating violent protest activity, Public Order Units were redeployed to the G20 theatre of operations. Additionally, the OPP deployed tactical medics and Obstruction Removal Teams (ORT) to support POU operations. OPP units directly responding to public order incidents (POU, TEMS, ORT) were under the operational command and control of the Toronto Police Service, through the Major Incident Command Center

During the early evening of June 26th, TPS redeployed the majority of their uniformed members from the G20 Interdiction Zone to support policing operations in the City of the Toronto where violence and vandalism associated with the G20 was continuing to escalate. Subsequently, the OPP was requested to redeploy uniform officers from G8 to G20 to maintain integrity of the G20 Interdiction Zone. The first wave of officers was immediately deployed on Saturday evening, June 26th, with an additional wave deployed on Sunday morning, June 27th.

The 2 senior OPP G8 Operations Commanders were re-deployed from the Muskoka Area Command Center to the Toronto Major Incident Command Center (MICC) to act as Liaison. Additional support units were deployed, including telecommunications and logistics.

Command and Control

The OPP utilized a comprehensive Command and Control (C2) structure for G8 and G20 Summit operations. Approximately 140 persons were assigned to the various command centers performing command, coordination, or support functions.

Command and Control was designed on a layered approach, following Incident Management System principles: Strategic, Operational, and Tactical command

Strategic Command

Steering Committee

The G8 / G20 Steering Committee, comprised of executive level representation from each of the lead security agencies, were located within the Integrated Security Unit, at arms length from the Unified Command Centre. The Steering Committee maintained a direct and continuous reporting relationship with the UCC Commander

Unified Command Centre

Primary strategic level command was delivered from the Unified Command Center (UCC) located within the Integrated Security Unit. A modified unified command system was used between the lead security agencies: although each agency contributed to a collaborative command within the UCC, all agencies agreed from the outset that the RCMP UCC Commander had ultimate strategic level command authority.

The UCC provided strategic level coordination between the G8 and G20 theatres of operation; any asset movement between the theatres required UCC authorization.

The UCC maintained reporting linkages to both the federal government (through the Government Operations Centre), and the provincial government (through the OPP GHQ EOC to the Provincial Emergency Operations Centre).

A Protective Services Operations Centre (PSOC) was established as a subcomponent of the UCC, directly responsible for the coordination of motorcade movements.

An Air Security Operations Coordination Centre (ASOCC) was established as a subcomponent of the UCC, directly responsible for the coordination of airspace security.

OPP GHQ Emergency Operations Center

The GHQ EOC provided strategic level coordination of OPP assets and operations for major incidents and events occurring outside of the G8 and G20 theatres of operation.

The GHQ EOC maintained a direct reporting linkage to the Provincial Government through the Provincial EOC, the MCSCS EOC, and Deputy Minister Liaison.

Operational Command

Muskoka Area Command Centre (M-ACC)

The M-ACC was the primary operational command centre for OPP G8 operations. The M-ACC utilized a true unified command structure involving the key agencies responsible for G8 security operations: RCMP, OPP, and CF.

The M-ACC included command / coordination leads for each of the major functional units, reporting to the OPP Operations Commander.

Additionally, Ministry of Health and Long-term Care, Ministry of Transportation, and Ontario Fire Marshall maintained embedded liaisons in the M-ACC to coordinate their operations in concert with security operations.

Greater Toronto Area Command Centre (GT-ACC)

The GT-ACC was the primary operational command centre for OPP G20 security operations. The GT-ACC utilized a true unified command structure involving the 5 key agencies responsible for G20 security operations: RCMP, OPP, TPS, PRP, and CF.

TPS Major Incident Command Center (MICC)

The Toronto Police Service utilized their MICC for primary operational command within the City of Toronto. The MICC provided operational command and control for the G20 Summit on issues exclusive to the Toronto Police Service. The MICC was led by a TPS Incident Commander and located in the City of Toronto. The MICC reported through the GT-ACC. TPS Tactical / Site level commanders reported directly through the MICC.

Tactical Command

OPP Sector Command

To maintain a manageable span of control within the G8 theatre of operations, the OPP's area of responsibility was divided into operational Sectors, each with an assigned Sector Commander.

Commanders reported directly through the M-ACC, and were responsible for direct tactical level command of operations within their sectors.

Each sector had a dedicated Command Post and briefing area, as well as assigned human and physical resources.

Joint on-water command platform

A joint on-water command platform was established between the RCMP and OPP. The on-water command platform maintained direct communication with the M-ACC. This approach ensured coordination of multi-agency marine security operations.

ISU Operational Command and Control Structure




Figure 5.1

OPP Operational Command Structure




Figure 5.2

Muskoka Area Command Centre – OPP Command Structure




Figure 5.3

Greater Toronto Area Command Centre – OPP Command Structure




Figure 5.4

PLANNING PHASE - RECOMMENDATIONS

- 1. Joint Operational Planning Groups should be established at the conclusion of the Conceptual / Strategic Planning Phase. The JOPG should include all operational and logistics lead planners.**

The JOPG concept worked extremely well. This approach drove interagency cooperation and ensured agency plans were interoperable and harmonized. In order to maximize the JOPG approach, the contribution of appropriate participants is essential. During focused plan review sessions, lead planners with a vested interest in the particular plan being reviewed (including those from other functional areas) must participate to ensure harmonization of plans across disciplines and functions.

- 2. A Community Relations Group should be established at the early stages of planning.**

The OPP established a Community Relations Group (CRG) for the G8 Summit based on the OPP's existing Provincial Liaison Team model. The CRG was mandated to develop and maintain open and transparent lines of communications with the community, residents, businesses, activists, and other stakeholders likely to be impacted by G8 Summit operations.

The two primary mandates of the CRG were:

Community outreach

The work conducted by the CRG paid significant dividends during all phases (planning, operations, and demobilization) of the G8 Summit, and cannot be overstated. One of the key OPP commitments was to reduce, to the extent possible, the impacts of the Summit security operations on the local communities. The overwhelming feedback from the community at large has been one of informed inclusiveness.

The CRG team members quickly became recognizable faces in the community, and essentially created an open window between the ISU and community at all levels. The CRG was often the first to hear of community concerns, and acted quickly to address these issues and dispel rumours.

Activist outreach

The Community Relations Group began engaging the activist community midway through the planning phase. The goal of this outreach was to establish open and transparent communications, and to convey police expectations of protest actions during the event. The CRG provided the appropriate ISU operational units with

information regarding protest group intentions. This outreach proved invaluable during the G8 Summit; protest groups that attended the Summit, who had early contact with CRG, experienced no arrests or issues with police.

Many of these groups were dealing with police for the first time and have forwarded letters of appreciation for the professionalism that the police demonstrated.

3. Major event planning and operations should be built upon the Incident Management System structure.

For the past several years, the OPP has embraced the Incident Management System (IMS), and has utilized this system for a number of major events during planning and operations. For the G8 Summit, the OPP conducted both planning and operations in accordance with IMS principles, establishing pillars for: Command, Operations, Logistics, Planning, Finance and Administration, Communications, and Intelligence.

The use of IMS established a clear line of OPP reporting and authority within the ISU. During both planning and operations, use of the IMS system ensured a manageable span of control.

4. The relationship between security and consequence management should be addressed at the outset of the planning phase.

Early in the planning process, a clear delineation was established between security and consequence management. Although consequence management had a substantial role, it was recognized by the Provincial government that the G8 and G20 Summits were security driven events.

The OPP, through its role in the G8 Integrated Security Unit, was designated as the provincial lead for G8 planning, preparedness and operations. Emergency Management Ontario (EMO) led consequence management planning and coordinated with other Ontario ministries.

Ministries that were directly supporting security operations (i.e.: MTO, MOHLTC, MAG) maintained dual reporting; through the OPP on plans directly required to support Summit security, and through EMO on plans required to support Consequence Management and continuity of government operations.

Despite the clear delineation, a close relationship was maintained between the two pillars. OPP and EMO lead planners met regularly to review and discuss issues and share information regarding planning activities.

5. Ministries and agencies providing direct support to security operations should be identified and engaged at the outset of the

planning phase. Where appropriate, consideration should be given to embedding support agency liaisons into the Integrated Security Unit, Planning Group. Agency leads should be fully engaged in JOPG activities.

The OPP / ISU partnered, from the outset of G8 planning, with key Ontario ministries and agencies required to support security operations. These agencies included:

i. Office of the Fire Marshall (OFM)

The OFM was the lead for CBRNe and decontamination planning and response within the G8 theatre of operations, as well as fire response within the security perimeters (CAZ and IZ).

The OFM worked closely with all ISU partners to ensure the coordination of G8 CBRNe planning.

The OFM was responsible for MOU development with Ontario fire departments required to support G8 security operations.

During the latter part of the planning phase, due to increased involvement in security planning, the OFM was actually embedded in the OPP operational planning section, working from the primary ISU building.

The inclusion of the OFM in the ISU proved highly beneficial to the overall operation. While the OFM focus was on CBRNe planning, they provided invaluable expertise on issues such as fire codes, Personal Protective Equipment (PPE), and Hazardous Materials (HAZMAT).

During the operational phase, the OFM was represented in both the Unified Command Centre and the Muskoka Area Command Centre.

Early inclusion of the OFM into the security planning process, and ultimately into the ISU, should be considered a best practice for future major events

ii. Ministry of Transportation Ontario (MTO)

MTO played a significant role in G8 and G20 planning and operations. MTO involvement increased substantially with the inclusion of the G20, due to the traffic management impacts in the Greater Toronto Area.

Mitigating traffic impacts in and between the theatres of operation was a key goal of the ISU; MTO assigned a lead planner, who worked closely with the OPP Traffic Management Team to achieve this objective.

Planning and operational functions provided by the MTO included:

- In concert with the OPP Traffic Management Team, assessing traffic impacts of the G8 and G20, and identifying alternate traffic routes
- Procuring and maintaining Portable Variable Message Signs (PVMS) on major highways and motorcade routes
- Establishing “no-parking” regulations pursuant to the *Ontario Highway Traffic Act* along Hwy 60 in the area of the Summit site
- Assisting with the Statement of Work and MOU for establishing the Interdiction Zone security fence along Hwy 60
- In concert with the Public Affairs Communication Team, establishing messaging for delivery to motorists and transportation agencies
- Addressing issues associated with highway construction projects impacting G8 / G20 operations
- Providing heavy equipment and emergency response for the rapid removal of highway debris and obstructions
- Assisting with road closures

Although not directly embedded in the ISU, MTO liaisons were assigned to both Area Command Centers during the operation.

Although the ISU held regular meetings with the MTO planners, many issues had to be addressed by telephone / teleconference. It would have been beneficial to have an MTO planner embedded in the ISU Traffic Management Team, particularly during the latter part of the planning phase. This should be considered for future events.

iii. Ministry of Health and Long-term Care (MOHLTC)

MOHLTC was contracted by Health Canada to provide on-site medical support to all G8 / G20 IPPs. Additionally, they were required to provide medical support within the security perimeters for all security forces.

Given their substantial involvement in G8/G20 security operations, MOHLTC established a full-time planning team from the outset of the planning phase.

Planning and operational functions provided by MOHLTC included:

- Establishing and staffing temporary medical clinics at the Summit sites, primary airport, and security zones
- Providing Emergency Medical Services (EMS) response throughout the theatres of operation
- Supporting CBRNe and decontamination response

- Coordinating with local health care providers to ensure continuity of health care

MOHLTC established a model planning process for the G8 / G20, conducting a series of progressive stakeholder workshops. Each workshop included presentations on current plans followed by scenario based discussions; many of the scenarios reviewed during these workshops played out during actual operations.

Although not embedded in the ISU, MOHLTC and ISU planners maintained a close working relationship from the outset of G8 planning. MOHLTC attended a number of ISU planning meetings and were actively engaged through the Muskoka Joint Operations Planning Group.

During the actual operations, MOHLTC was represented in the Muskoka Area Command Centre. EMS were collocated at OPP staging areas and the OPP Operations Centre / Prisoner Processing Centre.

MOHLTC conducted a post-event internet based survey to assess participant satisfaction, the results of which were resoundingly positive.

The planning approach taken by MOHLTC, and the linkage maintained with the ISU should be considered a best practice for future major events.

iv. Ministry of the Attorney General (MAG)

MAG provided invaluable support to the OPP, particularly in the areas of Crime Management and Prisoner Processing.

Planning and operational functions provided by MAG included:

- Establishing a primary and back-up court location, including dedicated bail and plea courts for G8 and G20 related matters
- Coordinating on-site Duty Council at the Prisoner Processing Centre
- Coordinating court translation services
- Working with the Criminal Operations planning team to develop consistent processes (i.e. charges and release conditions)

MAG was also instrumental in working with provincial court jurisdictions regarding the re-scheduling of court for OPP members during the Summits operational period, thus maximizing the availability of members for Summits security.

6. Each agency should establish an internal file management system that addresses individual organizational requirements.

The OPP utilized two systems for file management commencing at the outset of the planning phase.

An internal system was maintained, based on the IMS system, to capture all electronic and hardcopy documentation. All substantive email traffic was carbon-copied (cc'd) to a generic email account (OPP G8 File). Write-access to the electronic file was restricted to the OPP G8 management team and the OPP file manager.

In addition, the OPP contributed to the RCMP's Event Management System (EMS) planning module. Substantive planning documents were uploaded to the system; however documents such as internal briefings and communiqués were maintained in the OPP system only.

7. During events involving a protracted planning phase, and particularly where there are many 'unknowns', individual unit Concept of Operations plans should be developed. Concept planning should then transition to Operational planning at a predetermined time.

The G8 and G20 Summits necessitated the development of both Concept of Operations Plans, and Operations Plans. Traditional major event planning within the OPP does not normally include the creation of detailed concept plans. However, in this case the approach worked very well.

The OPP contributed to the development of the overall Strategic Concept of Ops plan (Strategic ConOps), led by the RCMP. This document laid out the overall mission, approach to security operations, risks, and agency roles and responsibilities.

During the early stages of G8 planning, there were numerous 'unknowns' that negated the ability to develop traditional operational plans; the planning that was undertaken was based largely on assumptions.

Despite the unknowns, there were requirements to identify operational resource requirements and budget projections. To accomplish this, each OPP unit developed a concept plan. While these plans did not include sufficient detail to 'operationalize', they did provide detail on the Unit's anticipated roles and responsibilities, linkages with other agencies, and the number of resources that would likely be required to provide Summit security, based on the current assumptions. In essence, the concept plans described, "How we think we will conduct operations", as opposed to the operational plans which described, "How we will conduct operations".

The concept plans were used extensively by both the Finance and Administration Section, and the Logistics Section to develop resource and budget projections.

The concept plans remained relatively fluid, until October 2009 when they were locked down and the OPP transitioned into traditional operations planning.

The delineation between concept and operational plans worked very well in this case, given the timelines involved, the uncertainties present, and the requirements to develop resource and budget forecasts.

While detailed concept planning will not be required in every case, for events the magnitude of the G8 and G20, they should be considered a best practice.

8. A change control process should be implemented upon submission of the approved Concept of Operations Plan.

Major event operational plans will inevitably continue to evolve right up to the point of implementation. Each OPP unit developed an operational plan, which was incorporated into the overall OPP Operational Plan.

Events having a protracted planning phase, such as the G8, will result in numerous Operational Plan versions. In such cases, it is critical that a consistent version control process be implemented.

During G8 planning, the JOPG *Terms of Reference* identified version “lockdown” dates for unit operational plans. The application of lockdown dates ensured consistency in plan versions for all OPP units and disciplines. All changes made to subsequent plan versions were highlighted, which allowed for easy tracking of updated information.

Version lockdown dates coincided with the G8/G20 Exercise Program, which ensured that the most current plan version was published just prior to the particular exercise. Lessons-learned gleaned from the exercise were then incorporated into the following plan version.

This approach worked very well and is recommended as a best practice, particularly for events involving a protracted planning phase.

9. Contracting retirees and students with specific subject matter expertise should be considered.

A large number of students and retired members were hired on contract for G8 planning and operational functions. The majority supported the logistics section; however a number of retired members with specific subject matter expertise (i.e. motorcade operations) were hired into the operational planning section.

The use of students and retired members mitigated the staffing impact to the organization during the planning phase, and allowed for more efficient use of uniformed members during the actual operations.

The OPP veterans association, through their website, was extremely helpful in obtaining expressions of interest.

The use of retirees and students was a resounding success and should be considered for future major events.

10. Agencies should fully engage their bargaining units / associations at the outset of major event planning.

The G8 planning team maintained a close linkage with the OPPA, who assigned a single point of contact to act as a liaison to the ISU. The OPPA liaison had a standing invitation to participate in weekly OPP management team meetings. Regular meetings and briefing were provided to the OPPA Board of Directors to address contentious issues early in the planning phase. Presentations were also given during the OPPA Annual General Meeting.

In the weeks leading up to the operation, the OPPA received an increased number of concerns expressed by members. The direct line of communication between the OPPA and the ISU allowed for all of these issues to be addressed.

During the actual operation, members of the OPPA Board of Directors deployed to both theatres of operation to directly liaise with members on ground. The OPPA was provided with the direct line to the OPP Operations Coordinator in the Unified Command Centre, providing a single window to expeditiously address member concerns.

Inclusion of the OPPA throughout the planning and operations phases proved extremely beneficial, and is clearly a best practice for future major events.

11. Traffic management committees should be established for events that have the potential for high traffic impact. Committees should include key traffic management stakeholders at the federal, provincial, and municipal levels.

Two traffic management committees were established, led by the OPP Traffic Management Coordinator, within the operational planning section.

A local committee focused on issues relating to traffic management in and around the Town of Huntsville. This committee identified potential problem areas, and generated solutions to maintain the orderly flow of traffic.

A second committee was established with MTO and policing partners to plan traffic flow on major and secondary highways, primarily in the Greater Toronto Area.

The work produced by these committees contributed to the success of the traffic management plan; this approach is recommended as a best practice for future major events.

12. Highway construction suspension should be addressed as soon as is possible during the planning phase.

Construction contractors can levy substantial penalties against the Ministry of Transportation for halting highway construction projects. If identified early in the process, 'no-work' clauses can be included in new construction contracts, however existing contracts require negotiation with a highly likelihood of financial penalties.

Wherever possible, highway construction impacts to security operations should be identified and assessed at the outset of the planning phase, and security planners must be prepared to give clear direction to the Ministry of Transportation on this issue.

13. Physical and information security protocols and processes, during both the planning and operational phase, should be identified and agreed to by all agencies at the outset of planning.

Each of the security partners had identified essential communications and I&IT systems for their organizational use during the Summits. The individual protocols and processes for the usage of some of those systems had the potential to conflict with one another. During future major events, consideration should be given to these issues at the outset of the planning phase, to allow for the development and implementation of the physical and information security protocols and processes that are mutually inclusive and limit any potential impacts between security partner systems..

14. The requirements, protocols and processes for security clearances and accreditation should be identified and agreed to at the onset of planning. All agencies within the integrated structure should identify a liaison for these functions.

The RCMP required that all members working in the ISU have a federal security clearance.

The RCMP accreditation unit was the lead for processing security clearance applications. Throughout the planning phase, a number of issues arose regarding incomplete information, missing forms, and the security clearance process in general. This resulted in substantial delays, in some cases months, to obtain proper security clearance.

Three months prior to the operation, the RCMP extended federal security clearance requirements to all persons who would be working in the Area Command Centres. Many of these positions were not part of the ISU, and were only assigned during the 1-week operational period,

including civilian radio operators, scribes, ministry liaison positions, and support staff.

The volume and short turn around time for these required clearances proved to be difficult and also limited the ability for organizations to make staffing changes in the weeks prior to the Summits.

It is highly recommended that, for future major events requiring large numbers of federal security clearances, the OPP designate a single point of contact to coordinate OPP submissions. This need not be a stand-alone position. The security clearance coordinator should receive base-line training from the RCMP regarding information required to process applications. The OPP coordinator should review all applications for completeness prior to submission to the RCMP, as well as track all incoming and completed submissions.

During future events, security clearance requirements and processes should be addressed at the outset of the planning phase. Cut-off dates should be defined and agreed to by all agencies.

15. Canadian Forces land clearance requirements should be addressed during the early stages of planning.

Canadian Forces land based G8 Summit operations required that land clearances be obtained for properties on which the CF intended or anticipated to operate. Since operational plans were developed using joint OPP/CF patrols in the Surveillance Zone, the OPP and CF addressed this issue jointly. A common land clearance form was developed which, when signed by the property owner, authorized the OPP and CF to enter the land in question for the purpose of conducting security patrols.

In the G8 Surveillance Zone, approximately 400 parcels of land were identified as requiring land clearance. The issue was identified only a few weeks before the Summit. The Community Relations Group took the lead to obtain land clearances; however the short timelines required substantial effort and overtime to complete this task.

It is recommended that, in future, the land-clearance issue be addressed early in the planning phase.

16. The issue of lawful authorities, particularly related to establishing and enforcing security perimeters, should be addressed at the outset of planning.

The lawful authority to establish and enforce land and marine security perimeters needs to be established at the onset of planning and incorporated into relevant planning assumptions. The authorities, whether provided under the *Foreign Missions and International Organizations Act*, legislation, case and/or common law all have recognized police authorities to protect dignitaries and establish

perimeters required to maintain security. Those utilized by each of the separate security partners should be noted within their associated plans.


17.A liaison from the event management entity (i.e. Summits Management Office) should be assigned to the JOPG

Lack of Summit Management Office (SMO) involvement in the Joint Operations Planning Groups led to some difficulties and delays, particularly in the areas of motorcade and traffic management planning. Constant IPP itinerary change is inevitable, however planners found it difficult to keep up with the changes without a closer linkage to SMO.

G8 SUMMIT OPERATIONS PHASE - RECOMMENDATIONS

18. Security zones / perimeters should be established based on concentric rings of increasing security levels.

Perimeters were developed utilizing concentric rings of increasing security around the Summit site.



This system provided for a clear division of responsibilities and allowed for focused resource allocation. During future major events, with sufficient planning time, this method should be considered a best practice.

19. Major event operations should be based on the standardized IMS system, including span-of-control. During mass deployments, emphasis should be placed on the roles and responsibilities of the front line supervisor specific to the particular event operations.

The use of IMS in G8 operations worked very well. Due to the significant number of OPP members deployed to the Summit, performing a wide range of functions, the role of the front-line supervisor was critical. Significant emphasis was placed on the supervisory function, and specific pre-operational briefings were conducted with team leaders to review their roles and responsibilities. All OPP functional units were required to develop their operational plans in accordance with IMS span-of-control principles.

20. During events requiring Canadian Forces personnel to conduct ground based operations, consideration should be given to conduct such patrols jointly with the police service of jurisdiction.

During the G8 Summit Operations, joint patrols were conducted by the OPP and Canadian Forces in the Surveillance Zone, which largely consisted of heavily wooded areas. Where possible, the OPP utilized officers who were also members of CF reserve units; this served to further enhance interoperability between the two agencies.

Conducting joint patrols maximized the use of OPP officers, and capitalized on the Canadian Forces unique capability to effectively operate on rugged, adverse terrain.

21. All officers must have a clear understanding of the roles and responsibilities associated to their specific security tasking, particularly those officers who are securing perimeter access points. Consistency in application is paramount when allowing or denying access to a security perimeter.

During early G8 operations, some inconsistencies in security zone access were experienced. Persons and vehicles (both civilian and police), who were not destined for the Controlled Access Zone, were directed into the vehicle and pedestrian screening areas where complete vehicle sweeps were conducted. This was inconsistent with security plans and with messaging that had been communicated to the public at large during the planning phase.

Officers staffing check points into the various security perimeters must have a clear understanding of their roles and responsibilities, as defined in the operational plans, to ensure consistency in perimeter access and messaging.

22. During events involving multiple area commander centers, motorcade operations must maintain a direct notification linkage to the Area Commander. Motorcade rehearsals should be conducted only upon authorization from the Area Commander.

A deficiency in communications between the M-ACC and the Motorcade commanders was experienced during the Summit. In a number of cases, the M-ACC Commanders were unaware of motorcade movements (actual and test runs). In one instance, a motorcade trial run was conducted during the shift change period resulting in substantial delays in moving officers (including command staff) into the area.

Motorcade trial runs created significant officer-safety situations, particularly for members performing checkpoint duties who were unaware of motorcade approaches.

In future, the Area Commander should be continually informed of all motorcade movements, and only the Area Commanders should authorize motorcade trial runs within their theatre of operations.

23. The use of Portable Variable Messaging Signs should be considered to enhance traffic management operations.

PVMS and overhead signs contributed significantly to the success of the G8 Traffic Management Plan. PVMS allowed traffic pattern and situational changes to be communicated rapidly to the public. The use of PVMS should be considered for all major events where substantial traffic management issues are anticipated.

24. The use of OPP auxiliary members to assist with support functions should be considered during all major events. Where a substantial number of auxiliary members are deployed, consideration should be given to identifying a dedicated auxiliary liaison officer.

A substantial number of OPP auxiliary members were deployed in support of OPP security, primarily in the area of logistics. The use of OPP Auxiliary members maximized the availability of regular OPP member for G8 security details.

Post event debriefings conducted with auxiliary members were overwhelmingly positive; the majority of members were appreciative of the experience.

Recommendations for future mass-auxiliary deployments include the designation of a dedicated auxiliary liaison position.

25. The inclusion of a Professional Standards Bureau Sergeant Major should be considered for any large mobilization of OPP human resources.

Given the large number of security staff deployed to Huntsville, the length of the operational deployment, and the concentration of persons residing within the Temporary Accommodations Facility, some conduct issues were anticipated. Accordingly, a Professional Standards Bureau Sergeant Major was on duty at the TAF, during both day and night shift, to address discipline issues.

G20 SUMMIT OPERATIONS PHASE - RECOMMENDATIONS

26. Although it is unlikely that Ontario will see an event of this magnitude again, should multiple major events occur simultaneously in the future, greater planning should be undertaken for the emergent redeployment of officers between theatres of operation.

Emergent deployment planning should include:

- a. Clear command and control, including: roles, responsibilities, and lines of reporting.

- b. A single point of deployment coordination at the front end, responsible for providing initial briefings, ensuring appropriate span-of-control, and providing an accurate count of deployed human and equipment resources.
- c. A single point of deployment coordination at the receiving end, responsible for providing initial briefings, ensuring appropriate span-of-control, and providing an accurate count of deployed human and equipment resources.
- d. Clear responsibilities for logistics coordination. In the case of a multiple venue event, a logistics coordination team at the upper-tier command center (I.e. G8/G20 Unified Command Center) should be established.
- e. In any case of emergent deployment, a logistics team commensurate with the size of the deployment should be dispatched.

Operational Command and Control in the G20 theatre of operations was delivered through the GT-ACC. OPP Command roles, responsibilities, and lines of reporting were clearly delineated in the G8/G20 Operational Plan.

Operational Command and Control for the Toronto Police Service was delivered through their Major Incident Command Center (MICC). The MICC provided operational command and control on matters exclusive to the Toronto Police Service. The OPP did not initially identify a requirement for a command liaison at this location, however once the emergent redeployment of uniform officers was requested, the 2 OPP G8 Operations Commanders were deployed to the MICC. An OPP Inspector was also deployed to the G20 Interdiction Zone to provide on ground tactical-level command and control.

Because these positions had not been anticipated, nor planned for, confusion in roles, responsibilities, and lines of reporting ensued. The role of the OPP Operations Commander in the GT-ACC vis-à-vis the OPP liaison position assigned to the MICC was not clear; as well it was not clear which command location the OPP on-ground commander was to report to.

i. Clear Command and Control

For several hours following the request for emergent redeployment, it was unclear which agency the OPP was actually supporting. OPP members were replacing TPS members in the G20 Interdiction Zone; however the IZ was ultimately the accountability of the RCMP. This issue particularly impacted logistical coordination.

ii. Logistical Coordination

Several instances of disconnect occurred in logistics support for officers redeployed to the G20. In some cases, multiple agencies and command locations were attempting to coordinate logistics. In one instance, the RCMP (through the UCC) had booked rooms for OPP members, the TPS (through the MICC) had booked rooms for OPP members, and the CF (through the UCC) were arranging for the delivery of cots. The first wave of OPP members worked in excess of 20 hours straight, many without proper nourishment.

iii. On-site command – Huntsville

The OPP M-ACC Operations Commanders were redeployed to the Toronto MICC. The OPP M-ACC Operations Coordinator assumed the responsibility of Operations Commander for the G8 theatre of operations, which ensured continuity of command in Huntsville.

However, no single point of command was assigned to coordinate the deployment of OPP members from the Huntsville Temporary Accommodation Facility. For several hours following the redeployment, the actual number of officers deployed could not be verified. Although the UCC had directed that 650 officers be deployed in the first wave, the actual count ranged from 619 reported by logistics, to 450 reported by the on ground commander in Toronto. The actual number of officers deployed was in fact 650. This discrepancy created substantial confusion in the booking of accommodations.

iv. Briefings

Briefings for members who were re-deployed to Toronto were not consistently conducted. In a number of cases, officers and POU commanders were deployed to public order and other security duties without a clear understanding of the situation or mission.

27. Motorcade and traffic units should be assigned independent radio channels.

Officers implementing the Hwy 427 closure plan and the motorcade personnel (advance car, communications and motorcycles) were all on the same operational channel.

Some motorcade members advised they turned their radio off due to the volume of radio traffic. This resulted in the motorcades leaving the airport before the Hwy 427 and Gardiner Expressway closures were fully implemented.

It is recommended that, in future, separate channels be utilized for motorcades and traffic management.

COMMAND AND CONTROL - RECOMMENDATIONS

28. Where an event involves multiple security agencies, a Unified Command model should be utilized.

A modified Unified Command system was used between the lead security agencies: although each agency contributed to a collaborative command within the UCC, all agencies agreed from the outset that the RCMP UCC Commander had ultimate strategic level command authority.

The unified command structures established for the Unified Command Center and Area Command Centres worked extremely well. This structure allowed for a collaborative and cooperative environment, while still ensuring individual agencies maintained command and control of their resources.

29. Those involved in the development of operational plans should be used in command, control or coordination functions during operations.

The OPP continues to recognize the sound practice of continuity between planning and operations. All members assigned to the operational planning section during the planning phase, transitioned into command and control positions during the operations phase.

Senior level operational commanders, who were not part of the planning phase, were identified and engaged months before the operation to ensure they had an in-depth understanding of the operational plans.

This practice ensured that members in command and control positions had an intimate knowledge of the plans, and the subtleties associated with their development.

OPP Sector Commanders were identified several months prior to the Summit. These commanders played a peripheral role in the exercise program, and participate in some OPP planning meetings and briefings leading up to the operations. A number of sector commanders felt that they should have had greater involvement in the planning process for their sites, including ensuring required equipment was obtained, tested and ready prior to operational dates.

For any event requiring the development of an operational plan, continuity between planning and operations should be considered a best practice.

30. For multiple events occurring over a wide geographic area, an Area Command model should be considered.

The establishment of Area Command Centres worked very well. This structure allowed operational commanders to focus on their own theatre of operations, with the UCC providing the strategic coordination link between them.

For any future major event involving multiple jurisdictions and spread over a large geographic area, the Area Command model should be considered a best practice.

31. All persons involved in planning and operational command functions for a major event should complete IMS training at a level commensurate with their responsibilities. All members involved during the planning phase, regardless of function, should complete an introductory IMS course (IMS 100).

For the past several years, the OPP has incorporated IMS principles into major event planning and operations. IMS provides common command, structure, terminology, and span of control regardless of agency or discipline.

All OPP members assigned to the ISU, regardless of rank or function, were required to complete IMS level 100 training. This is an on-line course, completed in less than 4 hours, which provides a base-line understanding of IMS principles.

Members assigned to operational command and coordination functions were required to complete IMS 200 and 300 level training.

Senior command positions were required to complete IMS 400 level training.

Mandatory completion of IMS training for members assigned to major events, commensurate with their role, should be considered a continuing best practice.

32. Dedicated Situational Report writers should be considered for all command and emergency operations centres during a major event.

The UCC and OPP GHQ EOC identified members as Situational Report writers during the Summits operational period. These members were responsible for preparing and sharing internal “Fast Facts”, information notes, briefing notes, etc.

These positions ensured rapid and accurate information flow between the UCC, OPP, and Province of Ontario (MCSCS and Cabinet).

The OPP had not previously identified this as a dedicated position within major event command centers; however this approach proved highly beneficial during the Summits, and should be considered a best practice for future major events.

33. The use of “fast-fact” reports should be considered for all major events.

Fast-fact reports were generated throughout the Summits operational period for the purpose of providing critical information and situational updates between established briefing cycles. Fast-fact documents were typically concise and single issue focused, ensuring command staff had current and accurate information on key issues.

The OPP had not previously utilized fast-fact documents; however they should be considered a best practice for use in future major events.

The use of Fast-facts should be clearly defined in the communications section of the Operational Plan to ensure consistency in application across multiple command centers.

34. Where substantial resources are provided to support another policing agency, the OPP should provide a senior command liaison, of sufficient rank and authority, to that agencies operational command centre to ensure that application of OPP resources is consistent with OPP policies, procedures, and best-interests.

The Toronto Police Service utilized their Major Incident Command Centre (MICC) as their primary operational command and control centre for G20 operations. In the G8 / G20 command and control plan, the MICC was considered a “jurisdictional command center”, reporting through the Greater Toronto Area Commander Centre.

Unlike G8, where the M-ACC was the one and only operational command centre, the G20 in essence had 2; the MICC and GT-ACC.

The OPP supported the Area Command concept, and opted to provide command and control from the GT-ACC. This worked well for OPP assets assigned to the GT-ACC, particularly traffic and motorcade management. However, a disconnect was realized for OPP assets not directly assigned to the GT-ACC who were supporting Toronto Police Service including: marine, public order, and OPP members redeployed to the G20 Interdiction Zone.

The OPP ultimately sent a senior officer to the MICC when a large number of uniformed officers were redeployed to Toronto; however the roles, responsibilities, and reporting relationship of this position were not defined through pre-planning. This resulted in the liaison position, on a number of occasions, reporting directly through the UCC, bypassing the GT-ACC. As well, the logistics required to effectively perform the MICC liaison function, such as telecommunications and network connectivity, were not in place.

During future major events, where substantial numbers of OPP members are deployed (or anticipated to be deployed) under the

operational command of another policing agency, a senior OPP representative should be in attendance at that agencies operational command centre to ensure that the application of OPP resources is consistent with OPP policies, procedures, and best-interests.

Pre-planning should clearly define the roles, responsibilities, authorities, and lines of reporting of that position. The position should have sufficient rank, authority, and knowledge of major event operations, to intercede on behalf of the OPP if required, and this authority should be articulated as part of the Memorandum of Understanding (if written).

35. Non-security agency liaisons, such as health, fire, and transportation should be considered for inclusion in major event operational command centres. Persons performing liaison functions should clearly understand their roles, responsibilities, lines of reporting, and security requirements.

G8 and G20 security operations required the support of a number of Ontario ministries and agencies, most notably the Ministry of Health and Long-term Care, Ministry of Transportation, and Ontario Fire Marshall.

Each of these agencies had members assigned in command, coordination, or liaison roles in the UCC and/or ACCs.

Inclusion of these liaison positions worked very well in this case, providing Operations Commanders with rapid single-window access to specialized assets required for Health, Traffic, and CBRNe support.

Inclusion of non-security agencies in a security / policing command centre has, in the past, created concerns in terms of the sharing of sensitive information and lines of reporting.

Discussions held during the planning phase with Ministry planning leads, ensured that members assigned to liaison positions within the security command centres clearly understood reporting relationships and security protocols.

While inclusion of non-security liaison positions in police command centers will not be required in every case, it did prove extremely beneficial in this event.

36. Where multiple agencies are involved in the security planning for a major event, particularly those involving a protracted planning phase, a Command and Control Concept of Operations Plan (C2 ConOps) should be developed at the outset of planning. The C2 ConOps should be made available to all lead planners as soon as possible.

A C2 ConOps was developed for G8 / G20 operations. This was an important document which outlined the command and control structure, levels of decision making authority, lines of reporting, and roles and responsibilities of the various command centres.

The development of the C2 ConOps began a few months before the operation, and was completed and signed-off just prior to the event.

For future major events, particularly of this magnitude, the development of a command and control concept plan should commence from the outset of planning. The C2 Concept Plan should be provided as soon as possible, even in draft form, to members assigned as operational planners to provide a base-line understanding of the command structure being contemplated.

37. Where multiple agencies are involved in the security planning for a major event, clear lines of decision making authority should be established from the outset. A standing senior decision making body should be established and meet regularly.

The lines of authority, reporting, and decision making within the OPP G8/G20 operational planning structure were clear during the planning phase. The use of IMS provided clear lines of reporting and authority. Weekly management level meetings were conducted where key OPP specific decisions were made and communicated. Section leads were responsible for ensuring this information was communicated to unit leads. The G8 Lead was responsible for briefing OPP senior command on current issues and decisions.

The lines of authority, reporting, and decision making within the larger ISU structure were not always clear in terms of interagency issues during the planning phase.

On a number of occasions, important inter-agency decisions were made during impromptu meetings between senior leadership. Although these decisions were properly made in a collaborative environment, it would have been advantageous to have important decisions made in a more formal environment, where discussion and decisions were properly captured in minutes.

As well, the ISU lacked a formal mechanism during the planning phase to ensure decisions were thoroughly communicated to operational planners, and across agency lines.

Early in the planning phase, “Interoperability Meetings” (IOM) were held. The initial intent of these meetings was an executive level decision making body. However, agenda and participation at these meetings varied greatly week to week. In the latter days leading up to the operation, participation was limited to senior decision makers from each agency.

For future major events involving multiple agencies and jurisdictions, a standing senior level decision making body should be established who meet regularly during the planning phase to consider interoperability related issues. Participation should be limited to senior decision makers and those presenting issues for consideration and decision.

A clear process should be established to ensure critical decisions are communicated to operational planners, and between agencies.

FINANCE AND ADMINISTRATION - RECOMMENDATIONS

38. Dedicating experienced business and finance members to all large scale and high cost major events early in the planning process.

Dedicating experienced OPP members from the OPP Business and Finance Bureau to the project on a full-time basis was beneficial. This expertise allowed the project team to leverage the existing processes and relationships with other OPP corporate areas (e.g. Career Development Bureau), Ministry programs and Central Agencies. This was helpful in conducting a multitude of transactions to bring staff onto the project, and in obtaining funding and procurement authority to support critical components of the security operation. The OPP's audit experience with previous major events was also an advantage in designing approvals processes and establishing audit controls. Dedicating members with financial expertise is considered a best practice in large-scale major events.

39. Conducting regular (monthly) face-to-face meetings for cost recovery to establish positive relationships with those around the table.

The OPP was able to successfully negotiate a number of unprecedented cost recovery provisions for the Province of Ontario. This success is owed in part to the excellent rapport established between representatives from Public Safety Canada and the OPP. Negotiations at times were tense and challenging given the scale of costs and potential financial and legal liabilities however these issues were worked through successfully in large part due to mutual respect of those around the table. Conducting regular face-to-face meetings regarding cost recovery negotiations is considered a best practise for an event of this scale.

40. Involving provincial Central Agencies early and consistently in cost recovery negotiations.

Starting from the initial meeting with PSC, the OPP invited members from the Ontario Treasury Board, the Ministry of Finance and legal council from Ministry of the Attorney General to participate in negotiations. This was beneficial not only in obtaining advice during the negotiations process but in securing support from these agencies when

the business case went forward for approval at the provincial level. Engaging these agencies early in the process where significant funds are involved is considered a best practice in planning for a major event.

41. Assigning a dedicated file manager early in the planning process.

Effective file management became a challenge as the number of members assigned to the project grew, particularly with multiple file management systems in place. Given the rapid escalation of OPP members to the ISU, having a dedicated file manager ensured that information was properly captured and filed. The use of a dedicated mailbox is also considered a best practise for any large-scale major event.

42. Assigning Dedicated Office/Administrative Support During the Security Operation.

During the Summits, most members of the Finance and Administration Section were deployed to Command Centres to perform screener/logger function. Two members remained in the office during the event. These members were called upon several times for information or to carry out various activities. This support was essential and is recommended as a best practise for future events.

43. Dedicated assistance from Career Development Bureau during the planning phase to support job classifications/levels and conduct competitions.

While consultations with Career Development Bureau (CDB) were beneficial in transitioning OPP on and from the project, some issues developed from project members relating to pay parity in relation to job responsibilities. Due to timing and the need for specialized skill sets, most members were brought onto the project via direct assignment. Having dedicated assistance from CDB to support job classifications/levels and conduct competitions would help ensure consistent pay for responsibilities across the project.

44. Regular re-evaluations of staffing requirements for all areas to ensure that staffing of needed positions is timely.

The number of OPP staff dedicated to the project grew significantly during the planning phase and total requirements were greater than originally anticipated. In some cases, the need for additional members was not identified until weeks after additional capacity was required. Regular re-evaluations of staffing requirements for all areas would have ensured that staffing of needed positions was timely.

45. Dedicating a member to monitor hours and keying overtime for large-scale projects.

Monitoring of hours and overtime keying for the entire project was done by an OPP administrative assistant. This workload was overwhelming at times and in a project the scale of the G8/G20, there is sufficient work for a dedicated member to take on this responsibility (and track overtime/ process required reports, forms and returns).

46. Ensuring sufficient time up front in the planning stages to allow time to properly establish consistent financial and administrative processes and procedures.

The rapid growth of the project team did not permit sufficient time to ensure all financial and administrative processes and policies were in place and implemented in a timely fashion. It is recommended that in future events, more time be permitted up front in the planning stages for a major event to allow time to properly establish consistent process and procedures.

47. Ensure that all assets assigned to members for the operation are returned and accounted for prior to processing any expense claims submitted.

Despite significant efforts to track all items distributed in support of the event, some challenges were faced in retrieving assets after the security operation. Logistics staff in particular were tasked with relentless follow-up efforts in attempt to locate outstanding inventory for a number of items. Under the Cost Contribution Agreement the OPP was unable to recover costs at 100% unless items were returned to the Government of Canada. In future events of this scale, it is recommended that all assets assigned to members are accounted for prior to processing any expense claims submitted.

48. One standard contract template should be developed at the outset of any major event in consultation with legal and procurement services.

Initially a number of contracts were negotiated (e.g. with various resorts/camps in Huntsville area for OPP accommodations) These contracts took on various forms based on the service being procured making it more time consuming to develop and have reviewed by legal representatives. Eventually one standard contract was developed and used to contract services in support of the event. In the future it is recommended that one standard contract template be developed at the outset of any major event in consultation with legal services and procurement to ensure consistency in items such as cancellation policies, service level expectations and security clearance requirements.

49. Dedicating a procurement/contract specialist at least six months prior to any large scale security operation.

Two months prior to the Summits, the Finance and Administration Section staffed a Procurement/Financial Analyst to support a number of activities including procurements, contracts, auditing and processing claims and invoices, and supporting security clearances. It was only after this position was staffed was it evident that this role should have been filled at least four months earlier. It is recommended for future events of this scale that a dedicated procurement/contract specialist is brought on at least six months prior to the security operation.

50. Insisting on an MOU prior to engaging in federally driven major events that ensures access to funding so that the OPP is in a position to procure the necessary items within a reasonable timeframe.

The single greatest challenge faced during planning for the G8/G20 security operation was the delay in approvals to provide funding. The OPP was put in an unfortunate position where delays in securing a Cost Contribution Agreement (CCA) meant that no procurements could be undertaken in preparation for the event. Funding approvals were not provided until March 2010 less than four months prior to the Summits. As a result, the time to properly plan and procure the hundreds of assets and equipment needed for the event was vastly insignificant.

This situation generated an element of risk to the security operation and put the Province of Ontario in a financially vulnerable position in the months leading up to the finalization of the CCA. To mitigate this potential risk exposure for the future, it is recommended that the OPP insist on an MOU prior to engaging in major events that ensures access to funding so that the OPP is in a position to procure the necessary items within a reasonable timeframe.

51. Escalating legal issues in time-sensitive cost recovery agreements for resolution at the Ministry/Deputy Ministry level.

Delays in finalizing the CCA created costs and time pressures in procuring the required services and equipment to support the security operations for the G8/G20 Summits. While these delays were caused as a result of the announcement of the G20 Summit, once the draft CCA was received from PSC in December 2009, significant delays ensued as a result of challenging financial and legal issues in the Agreement.

Though this development was outside the control of the OPP, for future events it is recommended that all issues associated to finalizing CCAs be escalated immediately for resolution at the Minister/Deputy Minister level.

52. When joint procurement processes are utilized there must be clear communication between the parties involved, particularly at the

working level, regarding the process for, and status of, procurements.

The OPP was encouraged to conduct procurements through the RCMP wherever possible. Procurements done in concert with the RCMP were not always successful, leaving the OPP to engage in large scale and complex procurements very late in the planning process when co-procurement was not possible.

While the joint procurement process created some frustrations, particularly within the Logistics section due to the omission of OPP requirements in some isolated incidents, the overall process was effective and created efficiencies in terms of workload. Although final overall costs are still pending at the time of writing, the joint procurement process will likely result in some financial efficiency.

Joint procurement is considered a best practice, recognizing that there are added risks to the OPP in being dependent on another agency to procure and deliver key items.

In the future, when joint procurement processes are utilized there must be clear communication between the parties involved, particularly at the working level, regarding the process for, and status of, procurements.

LOGISTICAL COORDINATION - RECOMMENDATIONS

53. Consider the use of a live data base and bar-coding for asset tracking.

The use of a live database, accessible by multiple users, for inventory purposes worked very well. This database utilized bar-coding for all assets, which allowed for efficient distribution and tracking. The use of a live database and bar coding system should be considered a best practice for future major events.

54. The logistics team should conduct trial runs, prior to a mass deployment, to test all processes.

The logistics section conducted a number of trial runs, simulating the processing of officers arriving at the event site and issuing of equipment. This allowed a number of issues to be identified and addressed prior to the operation. Conducting logistical trial runs should be considered a best practice for future major events.

55. Consider the use of Government Surplus.

The government Surplus was very useful to the G8. The OPP was able to obtain shelving, filing cabinets and white boards among other

things at no cost. At the conclusion of the event the equipment was returned to surplus.

56. Consider the use of Daily Activity Reporting system (DAR) specialist.

The support of a DAR Specialist was enlisted to address and clarify any DAR related issues. Their knowledge of the various databases and software was invaluable in ensuring the process for creating and maintaining the duty roster schedule seamless and efficient.

The specialist began assisting with scheduling on a regular basis approximately 3 months before the Summits. It is recommended that a DAR specialist be engaged from the outset of major event planning.

57. For all mass deployments, a coordinator should be assigned from each Region / Bureau.

Each region identified a deployment coordinator, who served as the primary point of contact between the region and the HR Mobilization unit. This approach worked well, ensuring consistency in messaging and regional approach.

58. Consider the use of identified bus-marshals.

Bus Marshall's were identified to ensure the safe transportation of OPP personnel and equipment from their host detachments to the G8 venue and return at the conclusion of the event. Regional representatives, in consultation with the Detachment Commanders, identified the Bus Marshals for all routes within their region. Bus Marshal SOPs were developed and provided to Regional representatives who shared them with Detachment Commanders and all officers attending the event.

The use of bus marshals should be considered a best-practice for future major deployments. It is recommended that, in future, bus marshals be provided with a cell phone to further enhance communications with the Logistics Unit while en-route.

59. A dedicated Telecommunications System Lead planner should be identified for any major operational event.

The detailed Telecommunications system planning provided the opportunity to design a robust, redundant and fully integrated layer to the existing deployed systems, providing OPP end users with the best radio solution to meet the operational requirements for the 2010 Muskoka G8 Summit.

Radio communications, telephone and IT requirements can be extensive and complicated in nature. It is recommended that a dedicated Telecommunications Lead planner continue to be identified for any major event.

60. Co-location of the Operations Communications Centre (OCC) and Area Command Centre should be considered for future events.

The proximity of the OCC to the Area Command Centre staff in the same facility worked extremely well, allowing for information flow and interaction between Command and OCC staff. The technical support required for the OCC also supported the Command staff. The backup fixed mobile radios (backup to dispatch consoles) were also reliant on local proximity access to the G8 tower sites. The RCMP dispatchers were adjacent to the OPP in the same room to facilitate information sharing between agencies.

An OCC Liaison, at the S/Sgt rank, was assigned to the Muskoka Area Command Centre. This position proved highly beneficial, providing a direct linkage between command staff and OCC. The inclusion of an OCC liaison should be considered a best practice for future major events.

The OPP experienced some technical faults that needed immediate attention. On-site technical support proved invaluable for repairing faults. Having the proper subject matter expert technical personnel working 24/7 drastically reduced the response and repair time.

61. An information booth(s) should be established at the accommodations areas to facilitate member needs and queries.

An information tent was established at the primary reception area and the Temporary Accommodation Facility, which enabled logistics staff to provide guidance and direction to arriving members. Logistics members working at that location checked in members and immediately issued them the training schedule cards and welcome packages. In the information tent, employees were assigned to the process of checking in officers. If issues occurred throughout the day, information booth personnel were able to answer any questions and provide guidance.

It is recommended that, for future events, an information booth be set up and staffed at the training site and the accommodation site.

62. The use of a professional AV company should be considered for major deployments.

Due to the number and size of staging and reception areas, an Audio-video technologist was contracted to provide audio and video projection systems. This approach allowed for superior equipment and service. Renting laptops from the AV technologist also allowed the presentations to be done without technical difficulties. The quality was superior and could easily be seen and heard by all personnel in the briefing areas.

For future major events involving mass deployments, contracting with an AV specialist should be considered.

63. The establishment of a logistics call centre should be considered for future major events.

A logistics call centre was established for the G8 Summit site, which allowed for identified issues to be rapidly addressed. The establishment of a call centre should be considered for future major events.

64. Inclusion of a database administrator resource to coordinate the collection and consolidation of data elements.

An *Excel* spreadsheet was used to track HR mobilization. As a result, only one person could utilize and update the information at a time. It was difficult to get information from the spreadsheet. Significant time was spent updating the spreadsheet and correcting data errors.

The System Asset Manager (SAM) Tool was designed for major events like this. It allows all personnel, vehicles, and assets to be imported and tracked electronically by barcode or serial number.

Major events require a data base that is live, up-to-date, and accessible by multiple users. The System Asset Manager (SAM) database has the potential to be developed to provide all information for HR mobilization. The database currently provides email addresses, gender, and rank and could be adapted to capture other characteristics that were needed to track personnel.

65. Facilities personnel should conduct daily site inspections.

Facilities personnel conducted daily site inspections of staging, briefing, training, and warehousing areas leading up to, and throughout the operational period. This allowed for issues to be identified and addressed quickly and efficiently. Daily inspection results were reported directly through the Muskoka Area Command Centre.

66. Key logistics staff should be provided with a Purchasing Cards (P-Card) with an extended spending limit.

On a number of occasions, purchases were declined due to P-Card limit restrictions. Members working in procurement should have had a P card with an extended limit.

67. Asset Management, Purchasing and QM staff should be co-located to maintain constant communication.

The QM was located in Huntsville; however asset management staff and all files were located at the ISU in Barrie. This created situations

where equipment was arriving without the knowledge of QM staff, and created unnecessary work involving invoices and locating paperwork.

It is recommended that the Asset Management, Purchasing and QM staff be co-located to maintain constant communication, adding increased accuracy to the flow of information

68. It is recommended that contracts contain confidentiality clauses that prohibit vendors from openly discussing the terms of their contracts.

The absence of confidentiality clauses for future events could lead to instances where vendor could openly discuss contracts with each other. This could result in difficulties when addressing vendor requirements on an individual basis. For future events, it is recommended that contracts contain confidentiality clauses that prohibit vendors from openly discussing the terms of their contracts.

EXERCISE PROGRAM - RECOMMENDATIONS

69. Each ISU partner should establish an Exercise Program lead.

The OPP established an Exercise Lead within the Integrated Security Unit who worked in conjunction with counterparts from the other ISU security partners. Working together from a single work location fostered a high level of communication, cooperation, and coordination between the agencies.

70. The ISU should identify an Exercise Program lead at the outset of the planning phase.

Exercise writing, development and facilitation were carried out under contract by a third party who was receiving direction from not only the ISU security partners, but also Emergency Management Ontario, Ministries, Municipalities, and numerous Federal Departments. This, at times, made it difficult to develop exercises that had a primary focus on ISU security plans.

During future major events, a senior ISU lead should be assigned to oversee and coordinate the integration of Exercise Program on behalf of the ISU. This position would resolve issues between ISU security partners and external agencies, provide strategic direction, and coordinate the development of the Exercise Program strategic vision and directives to ensure that ISU needs are achieved.

71. Scenario-based workshops should be considered.

The OPP conducted two scenario based workshops during the latter part of the planning phase. These workshops were 1-day in duration; the morning was spent providing detailed operational planning updates

from each of the functional areas, and the afternoon spent conducting prepared scenario based open-forum discussions.

These workshops required minimal planning and expense, however received overwhelming positive feedback from participants, as compared to other more complex exercises.

While complex functional exercises are still required to test command and control, lines of decision making, communications, and systems; the scenario-based workshop approach should be considered for any future major event.

PUBLIC AFFAIRS COMMUNICATIONS TEAM - RECOMMENDATIONS

72.A crisis communications approach should be included from the outset of major event planning.

The PACT employed a crisis communications technique during the planning phase and for ISU exercises. This approach however, was not used during the operational phase.

It is recommended that a crisis communications approach be included from the very beginning, and receive the assent of commanders, as an efficient communications tools to convey the right messaging to audiences in future major events. This is particularly useful in relation to social media and the need for immediate communications response.

73.Internal communications should be a key focus of future public affairs and communications teams.

An OPP PACT member was tasked with preparing / updating material for the OPP intranet and information was made available on a regular basis, including information regarding joining instructions and HR-related issues.

The PACT produced an internal ISU-wide newsletter to inform members from all participating agencies assigned to the ISU during the planning phase, and messages from the ISU leadership to update ISU members on planning progress.

During future major events, it is recommended that internal communications be a key focus of future public affairs and communications teams

74.All members of Community Relations Group should be trained in basic media relations.

The PACT conducted a one-day basic media relations course for members of the Community Relations Group.

This was deemed necessary due to the presence and visibility of the CRG members in Huntsville and their availability to local media.

It is recommended that all members of community relations teams be trained in basic media relations for future major events.

75. PACT supervisors should be deployed to the site of a major event ahead of the operation to maximize the effectiveness of Media Relations Officers during the event itself.

The OPP media relations coordinator was pre-deployed to Huntsville on June 14, 2010, a few days ahead of most PACT members. This allowed for a better understanding of the local media picture and to better prepare the arrival of the Media Relations Officers assigned to Huntsville.

The arrival of large numbers of security members and equipment from ISU partners prior to the Summit created media attention, thus the advanced deployment was critical.

It is recommended that PACT supervisors deployed to the site of a major event be deployed ahead of time to maximize the effectiveness of MROs during the event itself.

76. The relationship between the Community Relations Group and the Public Affairs and Communications Teams should be defined at the outset of the planning phase.

The PACT tracked all issues and requests for messaging, and was able to respond to the great majority of the CRG requests for messaging.

It is recommended that the relationship between the CRG and the public affairs and communications teams for major events be defined during the very early stages of the planning phase.

77. Key agencies involved in the PACT should obtain command approval for the overall strategic communications plan as a common planning document.

In the early stages of the planning phase, the PACT developed and updated a comprehensive strategic communications plan, which outlined the following:

- i. Vision, mission and objectives
- ii. Preliminary assignment of personnel and resources and concept of operations
- iii. An issues management strategy, media relations operating procedures, crisis communications plan, web and social media plan and different response scenarios.

It is recommended that the key agencies involved in the PACT obtain command approval for the overall strategic communications plan as a common planning document.

78. Translators should be available to the PACT on a 24/7 basis.

There were no translators available to the PACT in the late evening and overnight. Public affairs material placed on the ISU website had to be translated into French by a member of the PACT who is not a certified translator. While this was done successfully, time constraints and workload issues made it a challenge.

It is recommended that translators be assigned to the PACT on a 24/7 basis for future major event.

79. Meetings with senior commanders should be held prior to the operation to ensure all aware of agreed to processes and practices.

The approvals process during the operational phase differed from what had been planned by the PACT, and agreed upon by command-level personnel from participating agencies.

Meetings with all UCC and Area Commanders should be held prior to the event to ensure are all aware of the agreed to process and practices.

80. Scenario-based, re-approved messaging should be developed and confirmed by commanders prior to the actual operation, to expedite delivery of effective and on-target messaging.

Pre-approved messaging often had to be re-sent to ISU command at the UCC or ACC for a new round of approvals. The approval cycle often took longer than the planned 30 minutes.

It is recommended, as part of a sound crisis communications approach, that scenario-based, pre-approved messaging be developed and confirmed by command-level personnel prior to a future major event to speed up the delivery of effective and on-target messaging.

81.A PACT member should be assigned during the planning and operational phase as a liaison to the Government Partners Public Affairs Group (GPPAG).

The GPPAG was comprised of communications representatives from a broad cross section of federal, provincial and municipal agencies from all sectors. During the early planning stages the GPPAG interacted with PACT at many levels.

It is recommended that, in future, one PACT member be assigned during the planning and operational phase as a liaison to the GPPAG.

82. Communications and public affairs activities should focus more attention on social media platforms; social media should be an integral part of any communications plan to communicate with diverse audiences.

There was minimal use of the ISU social media accounts on *Twitter* and *Facebook* during the planning phase. A more aggressive approach would have helped to counter rumours and helped to achieve greater success in the ISU's web and social media campaign during the operational phase by adding to the number of "followers / friends" on *Twitter* and *Facebook*.

It is recommended that communications and public affairs activities for future major events focus more attention on social media platforms as those channels keep growing in use and popularity among key police audiences.

83. Personnel assigned to the communications team during the planning phase for a major event should have experience and expertise in strategic communications planning and not only in media relations.

The core of the PACT was composed of personnel from all ISU agencies, however not all were trained / experienced strategic communications planners.

It is recommended that personnel assigned to the communications team during the planning phase for a major event, not only have experience in media relations, but also experience and expertise in strategic communications planning.

84. A clear command and control structure with an executive leadership team that jointly share the decision making process should be implemented.

In the original Concept of Operations, the PACT leadership model was a joint RCMP, OPP, CF executive team. At about the one year mark prior to the Summits, the RCMP appointed an acting Inspector as the "Director" of PACT without consultation with ISU partners. This was followed by the appointment of an RCMP Media Relations Coordinator for both Summits without consultation. Neither position had clearly articulated roles; room for improvement existed regarding communication between the Director and the PACT

A clear command and control structure with an Executive Leadership team that jointly share the decision making process should be implemented for all future major events.

85. All partners should confirm their "rules of engagement" with their command staff at the outset of planning phase and re-confirm at the outset of the operational phase.

While it had been planned to have fully integrated media relations teams composed of one OPP, one RCMP and one CF MRO, the command element of the CF decided at the outset of the operational phase, not to have its officers engage in proactive media relations.

CF MROs assigned to Huntsville were relegated to only answer questions specific to the CF and were ordered to spend most of their time at the staging area, whereas the other MROs proactively engaged the community.

It is recommended that all partners confirm their “rules of engagement” with their command chair early in the planning phase and re-confirm at the outset of the operational phase.

86. During the operations, the PACT liaison should be located in close proximity to the Operations Commander.

Within the command and control structure for the ISU, the PACT was linked directly to the UCC Operational Commanders pursuant to IMS principles. However, within the physical layout of the UCC, the workstation for the PACT member that connected the PAOC to the UCC was located near the back of the UCC.

Within the PAOC, the physical design was similar to an operational command and control centre with 2 rows of 4 works stations each, facing monitors. Due to the design, many communications staff were forced to sit in a back boardroom. During the evaluation of incidents to determine the appropriate response by PACT, many senior communication staff were not consulted by the PACT Watch Commander.

The PACT seat within the UCC should be in close proximity to UCC Commanders. It is a recognized principle of communication that the PIO needs to be connected closely to gain an appreciation of operational matters to formulate the best communications strategy.

The PAOC room design should not mimic an operational design but be designed for a consultative approach.

POST EVENT - RECOMMENDATIONS

87. Following a major event, phase out of the ISU / event planning staff should be gradual. Sufficient staff should be retained to complete post event requirements.

The graduated phase out of ISU staff worked well. The process allowed members to complete post-event G8 related activities, while addressing the needs of the OPP at-large to recover seconded personnel and return to normal operations.

88. Major event planners should consider dedicated human resources to manage post-event Freedom of Information and Privacy Act requests.

In any major event, the scope of post-event FIPPA requests is difficult to project. The number of requests for OPP G8 / G20 material was not

substantial in comparison to other ISU agencies; however, pre-identification of members to coordinate post-event FIPPA requests should be a consideration in large scale major events.

89. Major event planners should consider dedicated human resources, and a pre-identified process, for the approval of post-event member expense claims.

The establishment of a post-event unit to coordinate IFIS claims worked very well. Clear processes were established and communicated to members, which allowed for efficient and consistent payment of expense claims.

90. A dedicated community relations function should remain in place for a reasonable period following the operational phase.

While post-event debriefings are routinely conducted for a variety of policing operations, formal after-action reports are not generally completed. In-depth after-action reports can be labour intensive, and are not required in many cases. Given the scope of the planning and operations for the G8 and G20 Summits, establishing a formal after-action reporting process was important to maximize corporate memory.

After-action reporting should be a consideration for future major events; however the scope of the process should be commensurate with the scope of the particular event.

91. For major events involving a protracted planning phase and substantial deployment of resources, the completion of a formal after-action report should be considered.

Retention of the CRG for 30 days following the operation was highly beneficial. The vast majority of community complaints and concerns were minor in nature, which were effectively addressed by the CRG members. Maintaining the CRG after the event assisted with the community's transition back to a pre-Summit state, and clearly demonstrated the OPP's on-going commitment to the community's best interests.

LIST OF ACRONYMS

Acronym	Definitions
2ic	Second-in Command
ACCs	Area Command Centres
AV	Audio Visual
C2	Command and Control
CAZ	Controlled Access Zone
CBRNe	Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and explosive
Cc'd	Carbon copied
CCA	Cost Contribution Agreement
CDB	Career Development Bureau (OPP)
CF	Canadian Forces
ConOps	Concept of Operations
CRG	Community Relations Group
DAR	Daily Activity Report
EMO	Emergency Management Ontario
EMS	Emergency Medical Services Event Management System
FIPPA	Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act
G20	Group of Twenty (Industrialized Countries)
G8	Group of Eight (Industrialized Countries)
GPPAG	Government Partners Public Affairs Group
GT-ACC	Greater Toronto – Area Command Centre
HAZMAT	Hazardous Materials
HR	Human Resources
Hwy	Highway
IFIS	Integrated Financial Information System
IMS	Incident Management System
IOM	Inter-Operability Meetings
ISU	Integrated Security Unit
IZ	Interdiction Zone
JIG	Joint Intelligence Group
JOPG	Joint Operational Planning Group
M-ACC	Muskoka – Area Command Centre
MAG	Ministry of the Attorney General
MCSCS	Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services
MICC	Major Incident Command Centre
MOHLTC	Ministry of Health and Long Term Care
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MRO	Media Relations Officer
MTO	Ministry of Transportation Ontario
OCC	Operations Communications Centre

Acronym	Definitions
OFM	Office of the Fire Marshall
OPP	Ontario Provincial Police
OPP GHQ EOC	Ontario Provincial Police - General Headquarters - Emergency Operations Centre
OPPA	Ontario Provincial Police Association
PACT	Public Affairs Coordination Team
PAOC	Public Affairs Operations Centre
P-Card	Purchasing Card
PPE	Personal Protective Equipment
PRP	Peel Regional Police Service
PSC	Public Safety Canada
PSOC	Protective Services Operations Centre
PVMS	Portable Variable Message Signs
QM	Quarter Master
RCMP	Royal Canadian Mounted Police
S/Sgt	Staff Sergeant
SAM	System Asset Manager
SZ	Surveillance Zone
TAF	Temporary Accommodations Facility
TPS	Toronto Police Service
UCC	Unified Command Centre

Conclusion

The 2010 G8 and G20 Summits were unique events in the history of the Ontario Provincial Police, the magnitude of which will likely not be experienced again.

The ISU planning team worked tirelessly to maneuver through the many issues that arose during the 18-month planning process; always placing the best interests of the Ontario Provincial Police and the communities we serve at the forefront. During that process, relationships were forged that will serve the OPP well during future major event operations.

Future implementation of the 91 recommendations gleaned from the 2010 Summits will continue to reinforce the OPP's expertise and leadership in major event planning and operations.

Those involved in the planning and operations should feel great pride in their contribution to the resounding success of the Summits, and the continuing professional image of the Ontario Provincial Police.